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Abstract—1. As security incidents continue to impact organi-
sations, there is a growing demand for systems to be ‘forensic-
ready’ – to maximise the potential use of evidence whilst min-
imising the costs of an investigation. Researchers have supported
organisational forensic readiness efforts by proposing the use of
policies and processes, aligning systems with forensics objectives
and training employees. However, recent work has also proposed
an alternative strategy for implementing forensic readiness called
forensic-by-design. This is an approach that involves integrating
requirements for forensics into relevant phases of the systems
development lifecycle with the aim of engineering forensic-ready
systems. While this alternative forensic readiness strategy has
been discussed in the literature, no previous research has exam-
ined the extent to which organisations actually use this approach
for implementing forensic readiness. Hence, we investigate the
extent to which organisations consider requirements for forensics
during systems development. We first assessed existing research
to identify the various perspectives of implementing forensic
readiness, and then undertook an online survey to investigate
the consideration of requirements for forensics during systems
development lifecycles. Our findings provide an initial assessment
of the extent to which requirements for forensics are considered
within organisations. We then use our findings, coupled with the
literature, to identify a number of research challenges regarding
the engineering of forensic-ready systems.
Index Terms—Forensic Readiness, Forensic-By-Design, Survey.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to a recent industrial survey, a quarter of all
businesses in the United Kingdom detected a security incident
in the previous twelve months [1]. The consequences of such
incidents for an organisation can include significant financial
losses, a loss of customer confidence and a reduction in
business reputation [2]. When a security incident occurs,
organisations usually respond by conducting a forensic inves-
tigation [3]. The purpose of this investigation is to collect and
analyse forensic data such as log files and network traffic, in
order establish the cause of the incident and how it can be
prevented in the future [4].
In order to examine the causes of an incident, investigators
rely on the availability of forensic data from affected sys-
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tems [5]. However, such data might not always be available
for a variety of reasons including limited physical access, short
data retention times and the costs associated with conducting
such investigations [6], [7]. As a result, investigators may not
be able to identify the causes of an incident [7]. Hence, there
have been increasing calls for organisations to maximise their
potential use of evidence and minimise the costs of an inves-
tigation by ensuring that their systems and infrastructure are
‘forensic-ready’ [8], [9]. Researchers have supported forensic
readiness efforts by proposing that organisations implement
policies and processes [8], align systems with forensics objec-
tives [10] and the correct training of employees [8].
In the past few years, researchers have proposed an alterna-
tive forensic readiness strategy called forensic-by-design [11],
[12]. Conceptually, forensic-by-design is similar to security-
by-design, where requirements for forensics are integrated into
relevant phases of the systems development lifecycle, with the
objective of engineering forensic-ready systems [11]. While
this approach has been discussed in the literature, no previous
research has examined the extent to which organisations
actually implement this approach to achieve forensic readiness.
Hence, our paper provides an initial assessment of the extent
to which requirements for forensics are considered within
organisations. As a method, we analysed the literature to
examine the various perspectives of implementing forensic
readiness. We then undertook an online survey to examine the
industrial perspective on the ‘forensic-by-design’ approach to
forensic readiness. The survey targeted practitioners tradition-
ally involved in the development lifecycle, as well as security
and forensics professionals. The survey results, coupled with
the findings from the literature are then used to propose
research challenges that emerge from our work.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the
research methodology and Section III reviews various perspec-
tives on implementing forensic readiness. Section IV presents
the survey results and discusses the threats to the validity
of our study. Section V presents the research challenges that
emerge from our work and Section VI draws conclusions.
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research described in this paper uses a two-step ex-
ploratory research approach [13]. We first assessed the litera-
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ture for existing research on implementing forensic readiness
within organisations, as well as relevant literature related to
the use of forensic-by-design approaches. After assessing the
literature, we then undertook an online survey to investigate
the industrial perspective on the use of forensic-by-design
approaches. The survey was designed and hosted on LimeSer-
vice [14], an online survey platform, from March to August
2016. The survey research method was chosen because it
provides a low-cost approach for collecting a large cross-
section of subjective responses from respondents [15]. The
survey consisted of twenty ‘closed’ questions2. However, the
number of questions actually presented to the participant was
dependent upon the answers provided during the survey. The
survey was divided into three parts. In part one participant
information was collected, while the second and third parts of
the survey presented questions on requirements for investiga-
tions and forensic data, respectively. The questions consisted
of 3, 5 and 7-point semantic scale answers. Where required,
we also included a text-box for respondents to provide textual
answers. These type of questions allow for eliciting subjective
assessment, while providing some flexibility when interpreting
the results [15]. The questions were approved by an Ethics
Committee at the University of Limerick. In total, the survey
took approximately twelve minutes to complete.
The survey targeted individuals via LinkedIn groups where
the focus of the group was software engineering/development,
requirements engineering, security or digital forensics. A short
post was placed in each group, inviting the members to partici-
pate in the survey. The survey targeted individuals traditionally
involved in the development lifecycle, as well as security
and forensics professionals. We believe that responses from
the later individuals would benefit our study due to their in-
volvement in security incidents and forensic investigations [4],
[16]. This recruitment approach aligns with the purpose and
relevance of the study targeting industrial professionals.
After closing the survey, all the data including any re-
spondent comments were aggregated and analysed using a
combination of a qualitative and quantitative approach. The
idea behind the analysis was to identify trends, patterns and
anomalies. Based on the survey findings and the analysis of
the literature, we then identified research challenges related to
the engineering of forensic-ready systems.
III. ANALYSIS OF FORENSIC READINESS APPROACHES
Digital forensics is often part of an organisation’s security
incident response capability [17]. While the objective of inci-
dent response is to restore service and learn about a security
incident, digital forensics is concerned with the collection and
analysis of forensic data, which can then be used as evidence
in court [17]. Several approaches have been proposed for
conducting forensic investigations (e.g., [5], [17]).
Traditionally, investigators only attempt to collect and anal-
yse forensic data concerning an incident after it has oc-
curred [16]. However, Rowlingson [8] argues that because
2http://spare.lero.ie/pdf/survey questions.pdf
organisations ignore what happens to their system(s) prior
to an incident, data that is required for an investigation will
either exist and is preserved by the system, or it does not
exist and the incident cannot be investigated effectively. These
concerns have prompted recommendations that organisations
take a more proactive stance to digital forensics and structure
their environment to retain data required for investigations [8],
[9]. This stance is known as forensic readiness [8]. Researchers
have broadly defined forensic readiness solutions along the
lines of implementing policies and processes, aligning systems
with forensics objectives and the training of employees.
1) Policies: Policies can provide a cohesive structure by
indicating what needs to be done within an organisation [18],
[19]. As a result, researchers have suggested that organisations
implement well–defined policies to support forensic readi-
ness [8], [20]. Barske, et al. [20] assert that these policies
include how systems are monitored, under what conditions
data is preserved, data retention times, as well as policies on
how investigations are to be undertaken. Rowlingson [8] adds
that policies should also cover topics such as identifying data
sources, determining data collection and secure data storage.
Endicott-Popovsky, et al. [21] argue that such policies should
be regularly audited to ensure continuous forensic readiness.
2) Systems and Frameworks: Tan [9] proposed the concept
of ‘system forensic readiness’, which consists of identifying
what data sources exist within an organisation and what
happens to data that could be used as evidence. This concept
has been well discussed in the literature [8], [20], [22], [23].
Separately, other researchers have suggested using technology
to enhance forensic readiness [10], [24]. The idea is that
technology can be used to assist investigators to identify
malicious users and their activities. For example, Reddy and
Venter [10] proposed an architecture for a forensic readiness
management system that includes monitoring for security
incidents, escalation rules, storing data, recording training
and descriptions of business processes. Similarly, Grobler
and Louwrens [24] put forward the idea that organisations
implement digital evidence record management systems to
retain potential evidence in its original format.
3) Processes: While some researchers have proposed using
technology, others have argued that well–defined processes
can help enhance forensic readiness [11], [20], [23], [25]. For
example, supporting forensic investigators with a well-defined
investigation process can help reduce mistakes during investi-
gations [23], [25]. Moreover, data preservation and collection
processes can also increase the speed of an investigation and
decrease the cost of reacquiring any data that was not acquired
correctly [8], [26]. Tan [9] adds that organisations should
have processes for defining how and what logging is done,
how systems are examined, and how forensic data is acquired
during investigations. Other researchers have suggested that
organisations have processes to identify incident scenarios and
the forensic data required for these scenarios [8], [21], [24].
4) People: Researchers have contended that organisations
should establish multidisciplinary forensic readiness teams [6],
[9], [22], [27]. Dalmani, et al. [27] argue that adding legal
experts to this team can assist investigators with determining
the scope of potential evidence to be collected. Grispos, et al.
[6] argue that integrating a human resources department within
this team can assist investigators with employees who are in-
volved in an incident. However, before this forensic readiness
team can assist investigators it must receive the correct training
to fulfil its objectives [8], [28]. For example, investigators
need to be trained on how to conduct a forensic investigation
correctly. A failure to do so can increase investigation costs
and result in compromised evidence [28].
5) Forensics-By-Design Approaches: In the past few
years, researchers have proposed an alternative forensic readi-
ness strategy known as forensic-by-design [11], [12]. Ab
Rahman, et al. [11] proposed a forensic-by-design framework
to integrate forensic tools and best practices in the design and
development of cyber-physical cloud systems. Ab Rahman,
et al. [29] later expanded their approach to include incident
handling capabilities and evaluated their approach using cloud
storage services. Mink, et al. [12] discussed the impact of
digital forensics on next generation aircraft systems and con-
cluded that forensic-by-design principles should be integrated
into such systems. While researchers have proposed the use of
forensic-by-design to enhance forensic readiness, no previous
research has examined the extent to which organisations
actually use this approach during systems development.
IV. SURVEY OF PRACTITIONERS
126 participants attempted our survey. Filtering out in-
complete and invalid responses resulted in 94 valid re-
sponses (74.6% completion rate). Nearly 55% of the respon-
dents indicated that they were involved in software devel-
opment roles. This includes software/system engineers (27
responses), software/project managers (14 responses) and pro-
grammers/developers (10 responses). The remaining respon-
dents included consultants (17 responses), security engineers
(5 responses), security managers (3 responses), security ana-
lyst (1 response) and other (17 responses). The participants
indicated that they were experienced professionals, with 75
(79.8%) out of the 94 respondents stating that they had more
than 10 years experience in an IT-based job role. More than
three quarters of the participants came from Europe (57%) and
North America (25%). The remaining participants included 9%
from Asia, 3% each from the Middle East and Africa, 2% from
South America and 1% from Central America.
The participants represented a diverse set of industries
including Information Technology (47%), Financial Services
(12%), Telecommunications (6%), Aerospace (5%), and Gov-
ernment (5%). We then asked the participants about their
experience with requirements management. Nearly 98% of
the participants indicated that they had been involved in the
elicitation of software requirements and just over 77% indi-
cated that they had been involved in the elicitation of security
requirements. The following subsections present our survey
findings from the perspective of considering requirements for
investigations and forensics data, as well as identifying the
practitioner’s perspective on these types of requirements.
A. Requirements for Investigations
Initial questions asked our survey participants if their or-
ganisation had in the past elicited requirements concerning
the detection, investigation, eradication and recovery of inci-
dents. These are investigation phases commonly cited in the
literature [16]. The responses are summarised in Table I.
TABLE I: Consideration of Requirements for Investigations
Requirements to assist with Yes No DNK
the detection of incidents 63.8% 33% 3.2%
the investigation of incidents 34% 60.7% 5.3%
the eradication of incidents 28.7% 63.8% 7.5%
the recovery from incidents 36.2% 58.5% 5.3%
The table shows that nearly 64% of the respondents in-
dicated that their organisation consider requirements for the
detection of incidents. However, a smaller number of par-
ticipants stated that their organisations consider the other
requirements. 34% of the respondents indicated that require-
ments to assist with incident investigations were considered in
their organisation, and nearly 29% of the respondents stated
that their organisation considers requirements to assist with
the eradication of incidents. Moreover, approximately 36%
of the respondents stated that their organisation considered
requirements to aid the recovery from incidents.
The participants were then asked where these requirements
were first discussed in the development process, with the
results summarised in Table II. Note respondents were able to
select more than one answer. The variety of answers that were
received from this question shows that organisations appear
to consider such requirements throughout the development
lifecycle. However, the results also indicate that in some organ-
isations these requirements are considered after deployment
(post-delivery). Consequently, this could result in increased
development costs and delayed release times [30].
TABLE II: Requirements for Investigations – Stages
Stage Percentage
During the problem definition/analysis phase 46.4%
During the solution development phase 19.1%
During the testing or evaluation phase 29.8%
Post-delivery 47.6%
Don’t Know 1.1%
Other 1.1%
An aggregate analysis of these two questions presents an
interesting view of the results. 16 out of the 94 respondents
indicated that their organisation consider all four of the re-
quirements in Table I. These 16 respondents also indicated that
their organisations consider these requirements in the problem
definition/analysis and solution phases. In other words, organ-
isations that are considering all the requirements in Table I are
discussing them early on in the development process.
We then asked the participants, who had indicated in the
previous question that their organisation considered require-
ments for investigations, about the stakeholders involved in
these requirements. The results are presented in Table III, with
the participants able to select more than one option. The table
shows that a variety of stakeholders are involved in the consid-
eration of these requirements. This includes software/system
engineers (41.7%), software/project managers (39.3%) and
security engineers (41.2%). However, the participants indi-
cated that other types of stakeholders are also involved in
this process. For example, nearly 35% of the respondents
indicated that security incident response team members are
involved in the elicitation of these requirements within their
organisation. These individuals are usually responsible for
conducting investigations within organisations [6]. The most
common answer from the ‘Other’ responses was ‘business
analyst’, with four respondents indicating this was the case.
TABLE III: Requirements for Investigations – Stakeholders
Stakeholder Percentage
Customers 21.4%
End-Users 22.6%
Software/Systems Engineers 41.7%
Software/Project Managers 39.3%
Security Analysts 44.1%
Security Engineers 41.2%
Security Managers 41.2%
Security Incident Response Team Members 34.5%
Others 6.4%
B. Requirements for Forensic Data
In order to examine the causes of an incident, investigators
need access to forensic data [5]. Hence, we proceeded to ask
questions surrounding the consideration of requirements for
the availability, collection, secure storage, tamper-proofing and
examination of data for forensics. Table IV summarises the
participant’s answers to these questions.
TABLE IV: Consideration of Requirements for Forensic Data
Requirements for the... Yes No DNK
availability of data for investigations 56.4% 43.6% 0%
collection of data for investigations 23.4% 71.3% 5.3%
secure storage of data for investigations 31.9% 63.8% 4.3%
tamper-proofing forensic data 28.7% 63.8% 7.5%
examination of forensic data 25.5% 69.2% 5.3%
The table shows that more than half of the respondents
indicated that their organisation consider requirements about
the availability of forensic data. However, if forensic data is
to be used during an investigation, it needs to be collected
and stored correctly [4]. Just over 23% of the respondents
indicated that their organisation considers requirements to
assist with the collection of forensic data, while approximately
32% of the respondents stated that their organisation considers
requirements to assist with the secure storage of forensics data.
Before an investigator can collect forensic data related to
an incident, malicious actors can modify this data thereby
influencing the outcome of any future investigation [4]. Re-
quirements to prevent the tampering of forensic data could be
one solution to this problem. Around 29% of respondents indi-
cated that their organisations consider requirements to prevent
the tampering of forensic data. Moreover, approximately 25%
of the respondents indicated that their organisation considers
requirements to assist with the examination of data.
We then proceeded to ask the participants, who indicated
that their organisation considered these requirements about
stakeholder involvement. The responses to this query are
presented in Table V, with respondents able to select more
than one option. Similar to the findings discussed in Section
IV-A, the respondents indicated that numerous stakeholders are
involved in the elicitation of these requirements. These include
software/system engineers (34.8%), software/project managers
(27%), security managers (30.3%), security engineers (31.5%)
and security incident response teams (22.5%). An analysis of
the ‘Other’ (10.1%) responses revealed that ‘other’ stakehold-
ers include legal and regulatory officers, software architects
and governance teams. This indicates that these requirements
are not just forensic goals, but legal, regulatory and governance
goals as well.
TABLE V: Requirements for Forensic Data – Stakeholders
Stakeholder Percentage
Customers 14.6%
End-Users 11.3%
Software/Systems Engineers 34.8%
Software/Project Managers 27%
Security Analysts 36%
Security Engineers 31.5%
Security Managers 30.3%
Security Incident Response Team Members 22.5%
Other 10.1%
After identifying the associated stakeholders, we then asked
the participants where these requirements were first integrated
in the development process. The results are shown in Table
VI, with respondents able to select more than one answer.
TABLE VI: Requirements for Forensic Data – Stages
Stage Percentage
During the problem definition/analysis phase 42.7%
During the solution development phase 18%
During the testing or evaluation phase 19.1%
Post-delivery 27%
Don’t Know 2.2%
Other 2.2%
The responses to this question shows that organisations
appear to consider such requirements throughout the de-
velopment lifecycle. In summary, 42.7% of the participants
indicated that these requirements are considered during the
problem definition/analysis phase, while 27% indicated that
their organisations consider such requirements post-delivery.
C. Practitioner’s Perception of Requirements for Forensics
In order to examine how practitioners characterise require-
ments for forensics, we then asked the participants to rate
the requirements presented in Table I and Table IV on a 3-
point scale of: “Security Requirement”, “Mixture of Secu-
rity Requirement and Something Different” and “Something
Different from a Security Requirement”. The results are pre-
sented in Figure 1 with the values presented rounded to the
nearest percentage. The figure shows that for eight out of the
nine requirements, the most common answer was “Something
Different from a Security Requirement”. With regard to the
remaining requirement (Detection of Security Incidents), the
most common answer provided was a “Mixture of Security
Requirement and Something Different”.
Fig. 1: Characterising Requirements for Forensics
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In addition to the above queries, the respondents were
provided with a definition of digital forensics and asked
“does your organisation elicit requirements for digital forensics
during its development lifecycle?”. The purpose of this ques-
tion was to evaluate the respondent’s awareness surrounding
requirements for forensics based on the previous questions.
In response, 23.4% stated that their organisation does elicit
requirements for forensics. However, 71.3% indicated that
their organisation does not elicit such requirements, while
5.3% provided ‘do not know’ answers. Examining the ‘No’
answers with the answers provided to questions described in
Sections IV-A and IV-B presents an interesting observation.
49 of the respondents (73%) who provided ‘No’ answers to
the above question, indicated in previous questions that their
organisation did consider requirements for investigations and
forensic data. These findings could indicate limited digital
forensics awareness among the participants.
D. Threats to Validity
Our empirical study involved 94 respondents in order to
assess the extent to which requirements for forensics are
considered within organisations and to identify research chal-
lenges that emerge from this work. However, with research of
this nature there is a need to evaluate the threats to validity,
which we analysed using a scheme presented by Runeson,
et al. [15]. From a construct validity perspective, it must be
acknowledged that there is a possibility that the respondents
did not fully understand the questions or chose to respond
arbitrarily. To mitigate this threat, the survey was validated
by three academic researchers and two software engineering
professionals. The researchers were within the domains of
requirements engineering, security and digital forensics, while
the two professionals are employed in organisations that are
involved in software development. The validation was done
by taking the survey and providing feedback, which was then
used to improve question phrasing and adding answer options.
In addition, we included validation questions in the survey
and have only reported responses from the respondents who
correctly answered those questions.
In terms of internal validity, it must be acknowledged that
we relied on LinkedIn to recruit survey participants. Hence,
the results obtained in the survey may reflect only the opinion
of the individuals on this social network within the specific
groups that were targeted. This threat is partly alleviated
due to the selection of groups on LinkedIn that focused on
requirements and software engineering, information security
and digital forensics. A potential threat to external validity, is
that we only obtained 94 answers from practitioners. Never-
theless, these individuals experience, industries and job roles
are widespread and we are confident that our results present a
broad representation of requirements for forensics practices
within organisations. With regard to reliability, the survey
data was analysed independently, first by the primary author
and then the secondary author. This also provided consistency
regarding the analysis of the data.
V. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
Our findings, coupled with the results from the literature
review has prompted the identification of several research
challenges, which we discuss below.
1) Elicitation of Requirements for Forensics: Our findings
show that organisations consider requirements for forensics
during various stages in the development process, including
post-delivery. As software engineering researchers and practi-
tioners [30] have discussed, non-functional requirements (e.g.
requirements for forensics) can impact a software system’s
architecture. Hence, we propose that organisations consider
requirements for forensics at the start of development pro-
cess. However, techniques for eliciting and analysing these
requirements have not actually been proposed in the literature.
Therefore, there is also a need to examine if existing elicitation
techniques can be used for ‘forensic requirements’.
2) Stakeholder Analysis for ‘Forensic Requirements’:
Our analysis of the literature and survey findings have indi-
cated that a variety of stakeholders are likely to be involved
in the consideration of requirements for forensics. Previous
work [31] has argued that the effective consultation of relevant
stakeholders is very important in the requirements engineering
process. We envision that the same would apply to stakehold-
ers involved in ‘forensic requirements’. Hence, there is a need
to investigate how these differing interests and demands in
requirements for forensics can be accommodated from these
multidisciplinary stakeholders.
3) Evaluating the Impact of Laws and Regulations on
Requirements for Forensics: Previous work [32] has argued
that different laws and regulations can impact the elicitation of
compliance requirements. However, further research is needed
to examine how these conflicts could influence requirements
for forensics. For example, the Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act in the United States could conflict with European
data protection regulations. Hence elicitation approaches for
‘forensic requirements’ could also need to take into account
laws and regulations from multiple jurisdictions.
4) Forensics Trade-off Analysis: The differing viewpoints
from which requirements for forensics can be elicited could
inevitably cause conflicts. As a result, engineering forensic-
ready systems is likely to require trading off ‘forensic require-
ments’ with other requirements, such as security and privacy.
Therefore, there is a need to first, examine the applicability of
existing trade-off techniques [33] to support forensics trade-
off analysis and second, if required, develop new techniques
to support trade-off analysis between ‘forensic requirements’
and other requirements.
5) Addressing System Performance Overhead in Forensic-
by-Design: Multiple authors have discussed the concept of
‘system forensic readiness’ as a means of implementing foren-
sic readiness [8], [9], [20], [22], [23]. Inline with the concept
of ‘system forensic readiness’, we envision that system perfor-
mance challenges could emerge when implementing require-
ments for forensics. For example, one specific requirement
could involve intensified logging of user activity, which could
result in increased overhead and reduced system performance.
Hence, existing research needs to be extended to analyse the
system performance challenges that could emerge due to the
implementation of ‘forensic requirements’.
6) Assessing the Influence of Forensic-by-Design on
the Forensic Readiness Ecosystem: We define a forensic
readiness ecosystem as the different elements and approaches
that an organisation can implement to become forensic-ready.
This can include implementing policies and processes, align-
ing technology with forensic aims and training employees.
However, existing research has overlooked the impact of
forensic-by-design on this forensic readiness ecosystem. For
example, an organisation may need to enhance its policies and
procedures based on the requirements it will consider during
the engineering of forensic-ready systems. Hence, empirical
studies are needed to assess the impact of forensic-by-design
on the wider forensic readiness ecosystem.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we undertook an online survey targeting indus-
try practitioners to assess and understand the extent to which
requirements for forensics are recognised explicitly and imple-
mented within organisations. The survey results suggest that
although organisations appear to consider such requirements,
a number of inconsistencies emerge. These inconsistencies
include when such requirements are actually introduced in
the development process, as well as the stakeholders involved
in their elicitation. Our analysis, coupled with a literature
review on forensic readiness, led us to recognise a number
of research challenges for the explicit elicitation, analysis and
implementation of such requirements. Future work intends to
further examine and validate our findings. This will be done
through in-depth interviews with practitioners identified in this
survey as well as empirical case studies to further investigate
organisational forensic-by-design practices. Future work also
intends to explore the possibility of using existing approaches
that are currently used to elicit security and legal requirements
in a ‘forensic requirements’ context. Any proposed solution
will also need to take into account the integration of ‘forensic
requirements’ into agile software development, techniques to
identify conflicts between requirements for forensics with
other requirements and support trade-off analysis.
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